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Abstract
It is common to model learning in games so that either a deterministic
process or a finite state Markov chain describes the evolution of play.
Such processes can however produce undesired outputs, where the players’
behavior is heavily influenced by the modeling. In simulations we see
how the assumptions in Young (1993), a well-studied model for stochastic
stability, lead to unexpected behavior in games without strict equilibria,
such as Matching Pennies. The behavior should be considered a modeling
artifact. In this paper we propose a continuous-state space model for
learning in games that can converge to mixed Nash equilibria, the Recency
Weighted Sampler (RWS). The RWS is similar in spirit Young’s model,
but introduces a notion of best response where the players sample from
a recency weighted history of interactions. We derive properties of the
RWS which are known to hold for finite-state space models of adaptive
play, such as the convergence to and existence of a unique invariant
distribution of the process, and the concentration of that distribution
on minimal CURB blocks. Then, we establish conditions under which
the RWS process concentrates on mixed Nash equilibria inside minimal
CURB blocks. While deriving the results, we develop a methodology that
is relevant for a larger class of continuous state space learning models.
JEL: C72, C73
Keyworks: evolutionary game theory, learning in games, stochastic stability,
recency, mixed Nash equilibria, minimal CURB blocks
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1 Introduction
The general setting considered in this paper is the evolution of social conventions
as introduced in Young (1993). There are large populations, one for each player
role, from which players are randomly drawn to play a normal form game. Before
deciding which action to take the players get access to a sample of historical
interactions. The players use the sample to form beliefs about the opposite roles’
historical behavior, and thereafter responds to the mixed strategy induced by
that sample. Once they have played, the history is updated, new players are
randomly drawn from the populations, and the process is repeated with the
updated history.
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History Expectations
Actions
Figure 1: The players form expectations by sampling from historical records
of interactions and then act based on those expectations. The realized play is
appended to the history.
Social conventions form and evolve in many real life situations. For example,
when buying a house each bidder (player) might not have participated in the
exact same bidding (game) before, but has knowledge about some, but not all,
previous interactions and assumes that the other bidders interacting with her
will behave similarly to how bidders have historically behaved. By modeling
repeated play based on historical records as diagrammed in Figure 1, one hopes
to answer questions about which actions will be taken in the long run, and
therefore which stable conventions, if any, will arise. We will refer to a dynamical
model for the likelihood of the interactions, interpreted as the social convention,
as a learning process.
When studying the long run distribution of the (state of the) learning process it
is helpful, both theoretically and numerically, if it is a Markov process converging
to its unique invariant distribution. In the original formulation of Young (1993)
this is achieved by defining the state of the learning process as a vector of size
m, a "finite memory" containing the m last interactions, by letting the players
form beliefs by sampling k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} strategies from the memory without
replacement, and by assuming a small mistake probability ε > 0 with which
a random action is taken instead of a best reply. The finite state space and
ε > 0 ensures that Young’s learning process has a unique invariant distribution
to which it converges asymptotically.
Most of the work building on the original model contains the finite memory and
noisy action structure, which is well suited for studying the relative stability of
different pure (i.e., strict) Nash equilibria or minimal CURB blocks 1. However,
finite memory based learning is ill-suited to answer questions about the players’
behavior around mixed Nash equilibria. The approach requires complete infor-
mation of the order of the history, and exhibits behavior around even simple
mixed Nash equilibria that is better viewed as a modeling artifact than as a
realistic description of behavior. The purpose of this paper is to define a new
learning process with the following features: firstly, it converges to some minimal
CURB configuration and secondly, it behaves reasonably also inside minimal
CURB and around mixed Nash equilibria.
1 A subset (block) of strategy profiles C is called Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB)
if the best replies to any strategy profile with support in C is also in C. It is called a minimal
CURB block if it does not contain any strictly smaller CURB block Basu and Weibull (1991).
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1 2
1 1,−1 −1, 1
2 −1, 1 1,−1
Table 1: The Matching Pennies payoff bimatrix. The row player has the "agreeing"
role, aiming to match strategy with the column player, who has the "disagreeing"
role, and aims to play differently than the row player. The unique mixed Nash
equilibrium is
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
, fifty-fifty randomization for both players.
To better understand the limitations of the standard finite memory learning
process, consider perhaps the simplest normal form game with a unique mixed
Nash equilibrium: Matching Pennies, presented in Table 1. Consider the case
where the length of the history is m = 9, and both players sample the whole
history and play without a mistake, i.e., k = m and ε = 0. Assume that the
history contains, reading from the oldest to the latest entry, four interactions
where both players took action 1, followed by five interactions where both took
action 2. The row player will then take action 2 and the column player action
1. However, since the interaction that falls out of the history is one where the
column player played 1, the sample to which the row player responds will not
change until the 1:s in the end of the history have all fallen out and the first
interaction with a 2 falls out of the history. At that point, the history contains
five interactions where the column player played 1, so now the row player wants
to play 1 as well. However, by now all the interactions in the history are such
that the row player played 2. So for the coming five interactions they will both
take action 1.(
111122222
111122222
)
→
(
222222222
222211111
)
→
(
222211111
111111111
)
→
(
111111111
111122222
)
→ · · ·
The behavior in the next period depends as much on what falls out of the history
as what is added, generating a cycling behavior. The cycling behavior does not
only happen in this special case but is a general feature observed when simulating
finite memory based learning processes, see Figure 2 for another example.
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Figure 2: A 10 000 period simulation of Young’s finite memory leaning process
on Matching Pennies with m = 1000, k = 20, ε = 0.05. Initiated at the mixed
Nash equilibrium.
To address the problem of unwanted cycling and to increase stability of social
conventions we introduce a new learning process, the Recency Weighted Sampler
(RWS). It differs from previous work in the structure of the historical record of
plays. The history is assumed to be infinite, but more recent interactions are
more likely to be sampled. A total of k samples are drawn with replacement
by each player at each period. The probability of sampling the interaction of a
past game decreases with a factor β, 0 < β < 1 per game that has been played
since. This geometric decrease allows us to use the sampling probabilities for the
strategies as the state space of the learning process. The Markovian property of
the process is preserved and we can in a meaningful way analyze it at a finer level
inside the minimal CURB blocks (and determine properties of the distribution
of interactions, i.e., the social convention, inside a minimal CURB block). As an
example, a simulation of the RWS on Matching Pennies is presented in Figure 3.
The RWS converges to a small neighborhood of the mixed Nash equilibrium and
then stays there.
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Figure 3: A 10 000 period simulation of the Recency Weighted Sampler on
Matching Pennies with β = 0.999, k = 20, ε = 0.05. Initiated at the corner (1,1).
1.1 Related Literature
Already in his dissertation John Nash gave a second interpretation of the Nash
equilibrium, the mass action interpretation (Nash, 1950). He assumes that
a large population is associated to each player role, that one player per role
is selected in each period to play the game, and that the individual players
accumulate empirical information on the relative advantage of the different
available pure strategies. He then argues, informally, that in such a setting, the
stable points correspond to Nash equilibria and those points should eventually
be reached by the process.
The mass action interpretation is appealing since its assumptions about bounded
rationality and repeated interactions are more credible than those underlying
the rationalistic interpretation built on assumptions of perfect rationality and
common knowledge2. Furthermore, experimental evidence clearly favors some
kind of learning and adjustment over the rationalistic motivation. The general
result is that in a one-shot interaction, play rarely corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium, but if the players have a chance to learn and adjust, play often (but
far from always) moves to a Nash equilibrium. See (Camerer, 2003, Ch. 6) for
an overview of experimental models and results.
Appealing as the motivation might be, the theoretical picture has turned out to
be considerably more complicated than indicated by Nash’s informal argument
2Especially since perfect rationality and common knowledge by itself only leads to rational-
izability but not all the way to Nash equilibrium.
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and what many researchers might initially have thought. One of the first, and
most studied, models formalizing a setting similar in spirit to the mass action
interpretation is that of fictitious play in Brown (1951). Even though Brown
thought fictitious play would in general converge to a Nash equilibrium, it was
shown in Shapley (1964) that even in a game with a unique Nash equilibrium
there might only exist a stable cycle and no convergence to the mixed equilibrium.
In general, it is the case that if the process has a stationary point, it must be a
Nash equilibrium, but the existence of such a stationary point is not guaranteed.
See e.g. Fudenberg et al. (1998), Weibull (1997), or Sandholm (2010) for overview
of such results. Existing general results do not address convergence to stable
points (which normally correspond to Nash equilibria) but convergence to stable
sets. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) show set-convergence results for evolutionary
dynamics and Balkenborg, Hofbauer and Kuzmics (2013) for best reply dynamics.
Similarly Hurkens (1995) and Young (1998) show set-convergence results for
dynamics similar to those studied in this paper.
Smooth fictitious play, first introduced in Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), is a
variant of fictitious play where players respond with a perturbed best response.
In contrast to the standard version of fictitious play, not only the empirical
frequency but also actual play can converge to a Nash equilibrium. In Benaïm
and Hirsch (1999) and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), global convergence results
are shown for some games with unique Nash equilibria, including interior ESS,
two-player zero-sum, supermodular and potential games.
A downside with standard versions of fictitious play and smooth fictitious play is
that the increments of the learning processes decrease in size over time. There-
fore, in practice, the point of initialization is therefore crucial for convergence.
Furthermore, if the behavior is cyclic the cycles take longer and longer time to
complete. Introducing a bias towards more recent plays, similar to that used in
this paper to define the RWS, yields processes with increments of similar size
over time, which for many applications is natural. Such processes are studied
in Benaïm, Hofbauer and Hopkins (2009), where the time average in unstable
games is studied, and in Fudenberg, Levine et al. (2014).
The one class of dynamics for which there exists quite general results for conver-
gence to equilibrium rely on a combination of noisy behavior and satisfaction
(Foster and Young, 2003; Young and Foster, 2006; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2006;
Block, Fudenberg and Levine, 2019). A given player randomly explores actions
until she is satisfied, e.g., her received payoff is higher than some threshold or
close enough to the maximum payoff observed. Then she keeps taking that action
as long as she is still satisfied. The exact setting and formulation of results vary,
but in general models of this category are able to converge to a Nash equilibrium
under quite general circumstances. The unsatisfactory aspect is that players are
in a sense too unsophisticated, at least if the game is known, and that the path
to equilibrium thus might be very long and somewhat unrealistic.
The existing literature building on Young (1993, 1998) has not focused on
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questions about convergence to mixed Nash equilibria, but instead focused on
questions about speed of convergence of the learning process Kreindler and Young
(2013) or improving tools for finding stochastically stable subsets Ellison (2000).
To the best of our knowledge no one has more carefully studied convergence of
learning processes to mixed Nash equilibria.
1.2 Summary and outline
In Section 2 the proposed learning process, the Recency Weighted Sampler, is
formalized and we introduce the tools we need to analyze the process. Since
we define a framework different from existing models (most crucially, RWS has
a continuous state-space) we cannot rely directly on any existing results and
we therefore begin by proving some standard properties of the learning process.
We prove weak convergence for a class of learning process, of which the RWS
is a member, to their respective unique invariant distribution. Following that,
we show that in limit as the error-rate tends to zero, ε → 0, the invariant
distribution of the RWS will concentrate on the minimal CURB blocks of the
game. Once we have recovered these crucial results, we turn to the question of
behavior inside minimal CURB blocks that are non-singleton, and show that
for any generic game where the minimal CURB blocks are at most 2× 2 play
will eventually concentrate around Nash equilibria or, when the sample size k
is small, close to some point on the k-grid spanning the simplices which is also
close to the Nash equilibrium. Proofs have been appended in the end of the
paper.
2 The Recency Weighted Sampler
We consider a two-player finite game G, iteratively played by two new players
drawn from large populations. The game has two asymmetric player roles, 1 and
2. The sets of pure strategies in the game are S1 and S2, containing m1 ∈ N and
m2 ∈ N pure strategies respectively; the spaces of mixed strategies are thus ∆ (S1)
and ∆ (S2). Throughout the paper, −i denotes the index {1, 2}\{i}, i ∈ {1, 2}.
For σ ∈ ∆ (S−i), we denote by BRi (σ) ⊂ Si the set of best replies of player
i to the mixed strategy σ. We identify ∆ (Si) with the (mi − 1)-dimensional
simplex and denote  (S) := ∆ (S1) × ∆ (S2), (S) being endowed with the
usual uniform distance ‖ · ‖. We denote by B((S)) and P((S)) the Borel
σ-field over (S) and the set of probability measures over (S), respectively.
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2.1 The stochastic best reply of RWS
Each interaction is recorded as a pair (s1, s2), with s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2 the
strategies played by each player. Denoting s1 (t) and s2 (t) the strategies played
at time t, the history is thus a sequence of plays
((s1 (t) , s2 (t)))t∈Z .
Notice that for t < 0, the history is just some infinite history, coding for fictional
plays for the purposes of our mechanisms.
At each time t, each player of role i ∈ {1, 2} samples k ∈ N plays (with
replacement) from the history of the opposing player role −i. Each sample is
drawn independently and samples are drawn with bias towards more recent plays
in a geometric fashion. Namely, players of role i have a bias β ∈ [0, 1], called
the recency parameter, such that at time t the probability of selecting the time
period t− τ , τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . } is
(1− β)βτ−1.
Therefore, a play of the strategy s ∈ S−i will be sampled by player i with total
probability
p−i,s (t) = (1− β)
∞∑
τ=1
βτ−11s(s−i(t− τ)),
where 1s is the indicator function on s.
We will call pi (t) := (pi,1 (t) , . . . pi,mi (t)) the state process of player role i at
time t and p(t) := (p1(t), p2(t)) for the state process or the learning process,
interchangeably. It is a vector of sampling probabilities obtained by player i
from player −i’s history and is an element of ∆ (S−i). The result of player i’s
sampling is a random vector
(
n−i,1 (t) , . . . n−i,m−i (t)
)
of integers, multinomially
distributed with parameters k and p−i (t). For s ∈ Si, let −→1i,s ∈ ∆ (Si) be the
unit vector representing the pure strategy s ∈ Si, i.e., a vector of of size mi with
0 everywhere except at position s, where it is 1. From her sample, player i forms
an empirical (average) opposing strategy profile
D−i (t) :=
1
k
m−i∑
s=1
n−i,s (t)
−−→1−i,s ∈ ∆ (S−i) . (1)
Player i now deems her opponent will play at turn t accordingly to the mixed
strategy D−i (t) and tries to play the best response to it. However, player i
can make a mistake. Player i’s error parameter (or mistake frequency) ε ∈
[0, 1] indicates the probability she will fail to play a strategy in BRi (D−i (t)),
and instead play a strategy in Si at random (with uniform probability). If
BRi (D−i (t)) is not a singleton, the realized action is sampled uniformly from all
9
the elements of BRi (D−i (t)). We denote the outcome of the uniform sampling
between all best replies to σ ∈ ∆(S−i) by B̂Ri(x) ∈ Si. The distinction we want
to emphasize with this notation is that BRi(x) is set-valued (the set of all best
replies to x) while B̂Ri(x) is Si-valued and random (one of the best replies has
been randomly selected).
In the end, player i will play B̂Ri (D−i (t)), with D−i(t) obtained as described
above, with a probability of 1 − ε; and additionally, play any strategy s ∈ Si
with probability ε/mi. We complete this section by calling
B˜Ri (p−i) ∈ Si
the random choice of strategy obtained by a player i through the following
process:
1. Looking at a history where plays of strategies by the opposing role get
sampled with probabilities given by p−i;
2. Sampling k of them to form the belief D−i ∈ ∆(S−i);
3. Actually playing the best response B̂Ri (D−i), except in a fraction ε of
the time when a randomly selected strategy is played.
2.2 The dynamics of RWS
At t = 0, an initial history ((s1 (u) , s2 (u)))u∈Z− , si(u) ∈ Si, is given. At each
time t ∈ N0, two new individuals are assigned to the roles. They use same values
of the parameters k, β, and ε. After sampling from the history with recency
parameter β, they play si (t) = B˜Ri (p−i (t)), i = 1, 2, where p−i (t) is exactly
the historical distribution of plays with recency bias. The realized strategy
profile (s1 (t) , s2 (t)) is appended to the history, and the procedure restarts. The
exponential nature of sampling leads to the following characterization of the
RWS learning process.
Proposition 1. The state process of player i, pi (t) ∈ ∆ (Si), obeys the equation
pi (t+ 1) = βpi (t) + (1− β)−−−−→1i,si(t) (2)
where si (t) = B˜Ri (p−i (t)) is drawn randomly according to the model.
The order of historical plays is not necessary to characterize the model, all the
relevant information is captured by (p1 (t) , p2 (t)) ∈  (S). From the position
(p1 (t) , p2 (t)) ∈  (S), at most m1m2 different points (p1 (t+ 1) , p2 (t+ 1)) may
be reached. Conditioned on p(t), for any s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2 the point(
βp1 (t) + (1− β)−−→11,s1 , βp2 (t) + (1− β)
−−→12,s2
)
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will be reached when s1 (t) = s1 and s2 (t) = s2, which happens with probability
2∏
i=1
P
(
B˜Ri(p−i(t)) = si | p−i(t)
)
,
since players sample independently, and
P
(
B˜Ri (p−i (t)) = si
)
= (1− ε)P
(
B̂Ri (D−i (t)) = si
)
+ ε/mi,
where D−i (t) ∈ ∆ (S−i) is a multinomial combination of strategies (with param-
eters k and p−i (t)).
2.3 Markovianity
By construction (p(t); t ∈ N) is a Markov chain taking values in  (S). Since the
state space is the continuous set (S), the chain’s transition kernel is a function
P : (S) × B((S)) → R with the standard Markov kernel properties. The
kernel takes a tuple (x,B) and returns the probability of the chain transitioning
from x to B in one period. The kernel is the continuous state space equivalent
of the transition rate matrix in models with a discrete state space. P is given as
the following Markovian kernel: for all (p1, p2) ∈ (S) and B ∈ B((S)),
P ((p1, p2), B) =
m1∑
s1=1
m2∑
s2=1
P
(
B˜R1 (p2) = s1, B˜R2 (p1) = s2
)
×
1B
(
βp1 + (1− β)−−→11,s1 , βp2 + (1− β)
−−→12,s2
)
.
Remark 2. An underlying assumption of the RWS is that there exists a prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P) carrying all the random variables necessary for defining
the learning process. The space is filtered by F, the natural filtration of the state
process, and satisfies the usual conditions. The assumption is innocent, it only
requires the space to carry a countable number of independent random variables.
It is in this filtered space that we subsequently study the learning process as a
Markov chain.
3 Main results
3.1 Ergodicity
Our first result is Theorem 3 which states conditions for when the RWS state
process is uniformly ergodic. We use the theory of Markov processes for the
proof, the theory can be found in for example Meyn and Tweedie (2012) and the
proof is found in the appendices.
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Theorem 3. If ε > 0 and β ∈ (1−max{m1,m2}−1, 1), then the Markov chain
with kernel P is uniformly ergodic.
In other words, for whichever initial distribution ν ∈ P((S)) that p(0) is drawn
from, the distribution of p(t) will converge "geometrically uniformly" as t→∞
to the probability measure µ∗ε which is the unique solution of µ∗εP = µ∗ε. More
precisely, for every ε ∈ (0, 1] there exists a unique µ∗ε ∈ P((S)), c ∈ R+, and
λ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all p ≥ 1,
(Wp(νPn, µ∗ε))
p ≤ cλn, ν ∈ P((S)),
where Wp is the Wasserstein distance of order p between measures on (S) (Vil-
lani, 2008, Def. 6.1) and c is a positive constant depending only on maxx∈(S) |x|
and p.
The theorem itself is more general than what is needed for the goal of this paper.
The result holds for any Markov chain with a compact state space and with
a dynamic of the form (2), as long as there is a positive lower bound for the
probability that any strategy is played (in any state) and that this probability is
Lipschitz as a function of the state. Examples of other best response functions
than the one studied here for which Theorem 3 applies are the logit best reply,
i.e.,
P
[
B˜Ri(p) = si
]
= exp(ηpii(si, p−i))∑
a∈Si exp(ηpii(a, p−i))
for some η > 0, models where k itself is a random parameter, and models where
only robust best responses to the sample are considered.
3.2 Convergence to minimal CURB configurations
Before turning to the convergence to minimal CURB blocks, one minor technical
detail most be resolved. A minimal CURB block is a collection of strategy
profiles C1 × C2 ⊂ S such that the best reply to all mixed strategies in in the
sub-simplex spanned by those strategies is always inside the set, i.e. BR(σ) ⊂ C
for all σ ∈  (C), where  (C) := ∆ (C1)×∆ (C2). However, since our agents
only reply to samples of size k, it might be the case that the mixed strategy
from the simplex that has a best reply outside a non-CURB block simply never
is sampled. The game below is a simple illustration of this point.
1 2
1 2,−100 −100, 2
2 −100, 2 2,−100
3 1, 0 1, 0
If k = 1 only the best replies to pure strategies will ever be considered. If the
process initially has support only on the block {1,2} × {1,2}, the best reply to
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any sample will be inside that block, even though 3 is the best reply to most
properly mixed strategies. We could call this smaller set of blocks that are closed
under best replies to any strategies on the k-lattice k-CURB blocks. In most
settings, a relatively small k is enough for the k-CURB blocks to coincide with
the CURB blocks. In the rest of the paper, we will speak of CURB blocks and
by that mean k-CURB blocks. Alternatively, one can think of k as sufficiently
large so that the notions coincide.
In what follows, we first prove that the RWS concentrates (in probability)
on minimal CURB blocks for general two player games. Then we prove the
concentration of RWS paths to an approximate mixed Nash equilibrium for
games with m1 = m2 = 2 and a unique mixed Nash equilibrium.
3.2.1 Concentration on minimal CURB blocks
While proving concentration of the RWS on minimal CURB blocks we will
partially rely on results for the original finite memory learning process. The
RWS dynamics introduces some difficulties that are not present in the original
model, mainly that once a strategy has been played it never truly disappears
from memory but always has a positive probability of being sampled. However,
the probability of sampling that strategy decreases over time as long as the
strategy is not played again. A notion well-suited for the RWS is therefore the
neighbourhood Bδ(C), δ > 0, of C := C1 × C2 ⊂ S, defined as all pairs (p1, p2)
in  (S) such that each of the components puts at least 1− δ probability on the
block C.
Definition 4. For all δ > 0,
Bδ(C) :=
{
p = (p1, p2) ∈  (S) |
mi∑
s=1
pi,s1Ci(s) ≥ 1− δ, i = 1, 2
}
.
Let C denote the union of all minimal CURB blocks in the game. To prove the
concentration result Theorem 5, we show that expected time to go from Bδ(C )c
to Bδ(C ) is always bounded, but the expected time spent inside Bδ(C ) once
entered goes to infinity as ε goes to zero. This in turn will imply that as ε goes
to zero, the invariant distribution concentrates on the neighbourhood C , the
union of all minimal CURB blocks.
Theorem 5. If β ∈ (1−max{m1,m2}−1, 1), then for all δ > 0 it holds that as
ε→ 0, the invariant distribution of the Markov chain p concentrates on Bδ(C ),
lim
ε→0
µ∗ε (Bδ(C )) = 1.
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3.2.2 Behavior inside minimal CURB
The previous section shows that as ε approaches zero, the RWS spends almost
all the time inside minimal CURB blocks, possibly with rare excursions between
different minimal CURB blocks. In this section, we justify that the RWS can
actually concentrate on mixed Nash equilibria inside minimal CURB sets. This
property is the main motivation for introducing the RWS and in contrast to
similar learning processes.
Consider the deterministic mean-value process x,
x˙i(t) = E
[
B˜Ri(x−i(t))
]
− xi(t), xi(0) = pi(0). (3)
The process in (3) is a deterministic process that can be thought of as a continuous-
time evolution of the expected value of the RWS state process (2). As a
consequence of Lemma 18, if inside a given minimal CURB, the process (3)
converges to either a stable point or a stable orbit with constant distance to a
stable point, at least for ε small enough.
We show in Lemma 19, found in the appendices, that for a given time horizon
T , divided into N time steps of size (1 − β), T = N(1 − β), and η > 0, the
probability that the RWS stays closer than η to the deterministic process x
during [0, T ] goes to 1 as β goes to 1. Taken together, if the deterministic process
behaves well in the minimal CURB blocks of a game, we can by tuning β control
the RWS and its concentration around stable points or stable orbits. The next
theorem states that for a 2× 2 minimal CURB block with a unique mixed Nash
equilibrium the RWS concentrates around a stable point of (3), which is unique.
Theorem 6. Let G be a 2 × 2 normal form game with a unique completely
mixed Nash equilibrium. If β > 1/2, then, for all ε, η > 0 there exists a positive
constant K such that
µ∗ε (x ∈ (S) : ‖x− n∗‖∞ ≥ η) = o
(
exp
(
− Kη
2
1− β
))
where n∗ is the unique stationary point of (3).
The stationary point of (3) naturally depends on k. Under the assumptions in
the theorem above, as k → ∞ the equation (x˙1(t), x˙2(t)) = (0, 0) is satisfied
only by the Nash equilibrium, and we have that limk→∞ n∗ = N∗. So n∗ can be
interpreted as a approximation of the Nash equilibrium.
The result of Theorem 6 can be extended to games of any size as long as they
contain only minimal CURB blocks that are either 1× 1, or are 2× 2 and satisfy
the assumption in Theorem 6. An argument can be found found in (Aurell, 2019,
II.E).
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4 Conclusions and outlook
In this paper we have introduced a new process of adaptive play with sampling
from history and recency, the RWS, and shown that it has several interesting
properties. The invariant distribution of the RWS, which is a Markov process,
concentrates on minimal CURB blocks as the mistake probability ε goes to zero.
So in the long run, the RWS will almost always be inside a minimal CURB,
perhaps with rare transitions between them. While the process is inside a given
minimal CURB, the deterministic (mean) dynamics of the RWS will converge to
either a stable point or a stable orbit, and the stochastic RWS state process does
not deviate far from it during any finite time horizon with a high probability,
if β is sufficiently close to 1. Combining these results we see that as ε and β
approach 0 and 1, respectively, the RWS almost always is in the neighbourhood
of a stable point or a stable orbit inside a minimal CURB. Furthermore, since
the sampling best reply function we consider is continuous, this implies that if
the state p(t) is close to some stable point, then so is play.
For 2× 2 minimal CURB blocks with a unique Nash equilibrium, we have shown
that the deterministic process has a unique stable point which is close to the
Nash equilibrium for most values of k. For games with minimal CURB blocks
larger than 2× 2, the picture is more complicated, and it is beyond the scope
of this paper to completely map it out. However, for small to intermediate k
the RWS behaves well, at least numerically, when other learning dynamics does
not. Consider the unstable rock paper scissors game, see Table 2, studied in e.g.
Benaïm, Hofbauer and Hopkins (2009).
R P S
R 0, 0 −3, 1 1,−3
P 1,−3 0, 0 −2, 1
S −3, 1 1,−2 0, 0
Table 2: The payoff in the Unstable Rock Paper Scissors game. The unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium is
( 9
32 ,
10
32 ,
13
32
)
.
Classical learning processes such as fictitious play or reinforcement learning
circles the Nash equilibrium in a stable cycle. In Figure 4 we compare the
performance of RWS with k = 20 and fictitious play with recency. The RWS
remains close to the equilibrium over time, even in this unstable game, while the
fictitious play dynamic circles the equilibrium. When k is larger the RWS behaves
as fictitious play with recency. This is expected, as k grows the sampled beliefs
(D1, D2), see (1), become more and more similar to the sampling probabilities
by the law of large numbers.
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(a) RWS with ε = 0 and k = 20. (b) Fictitious play with recency.
Figure 4: Simulations of behavior in the Unstable Rock Paper Scissors game.
Left: RWS with a low k-value and no noise. Right: fictitious play with recency.
The recency parameter was set to β = 0.9999 in both simulations.
There are still many unanswered questions about the RWS learning process.
For example, we have not analyzed which minimal CURB configuration will
have positive measure in the long run. It should be possible to conduct such an
analysis using standard radius and co-radius arguments as in Ellison (2000) or
Benaïm and Weibull (2003), but this is outside the scope of the current paper.
On a final note, we expect that our results for 2× 2 games can be extended to
games with interior ESS, zero-sum games, potential games, and supermodular
games, e.g. by following the techniques in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002).
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A The basic properties of the learning process:
proofs
A.1 Exponential history
Let us prove Proposition 1. Starting from the definition, we have
p−i,s (t+ 1) = (1− β)
∞∑
τ=1
βτ−11s(s−i(t− τ + 1)).
After index substitution v = τ − 1, splitting the term v = 0 yields
p−i,s (t+ 1) = (1− β)
(
1s(s−i(t)) +
∞∑
v=1
βv1s(s−i(t− v))
)
.
In other words,
p−i,s (t+ 1) = (1− β)β
∞∑
v=1
βv−11s(s−i(t− v)) + (1− β) 1s(s−i(t)).
We recognize the first term as p−i,s (t), so we are left for every s ∈ S−i with
p−i,s (t+ 1) = βp−i,s (t) + (1− β) 1s(s−i(t)),
which is the representation we seek.
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A.2 Lipschitz continuity
Lemma 7. For all k ∈ N, i ∈ {1, 2}, and a ∈ {1, . . . ,mi},
∆(S−i) 3 p→ P
(
B˜Ri(p) = a
)
is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz coefficient at most (1− ε)km−i.
Proof. At the beginning there is a sample with respect to probabilities p, yielding
a random vector N :=
(
n−i,1 (t) , . . . n−i,m−i (t)
)
of integers from the (discrete)
probability distribution
P
(
N =
(
n1, . . . nm−i
))
= k!
m−i∏
j=1
pnss
ns!
.
Each N will lead to an empirical opposing strategy profile D, that must belong
to some finite ’simplex grid’
∆(−i,k) :=
1k ∑
s∈S−i
ns
−−→1−i,s ; ns ∈ N0,
∑
s∈S−i
ns = k
 .
Now let us form mi subsets from ∆(−i,k) (which is finite), named ∆(−i,k)s for
s ∈ Si, where x ∈ ∆(−i,k)s whenever s ∈ BRi(x). Note that (∆(−i,k)s )s is not a
disjoint cover of ∆(−i,k) except in the special case when each x ∈ ∆(−i,k) has a
unique best response. Also, ∪s∆−i,ks = ∆−i,k since the best response set is never
empty.
For a ≤ mi, the probability that B˜Ri (p) = a is going to be played is thus
obtained as follows :
• If the player i trembles, which happens a fraction ε of the time, strategy a
is played with a probability 1/mi, totalling ε/mi.
• Otherwise the player selects its best response, so it will be a with the
probability P
(
D ∈ ∆(−i,k)a , B̂Ri(D) = a
)
.
In short,
P
(
B˜Ri (p) = a
)
= εra + (1− ε)
∑
x∈∆(−i,k)a
P
(
B̂Ri(x) = a
)
P (D = x) . (4)
However D = x is an event of the shape N =
(
n1, . . . nm−i
)
, so considering
P (D = x) as a function of p1, . . . pn, we get
∂P
(
N =
(
n1, . . . nm−i
))
∂pb
= k! p
nb−1
b
(nb − 1)!
∏
j 6=b
p
nj
j
nj !
,
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with the convention 1/ (−1)! = 0 for continuity. So relatively to the norm ‖.‖∞
over ∆ (S−i), the Lipschitz constant of the probabilities P
(
D ∈ ∆(−i,k)a
)
are at
most
m−i∑
b=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂P
(
D ∈ ∆(−i,k)a
)
∂pb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
m−i∑
b=1
∑
x∈∆(−i,k)a
k! p
nb−1
b
(nb − 1)!
m−i∏
j=1
j 6=b
p
nj
j
nj !
.
However we know that
∑
x∈∆(−i,k)
pnb−1b
(nb − 1)!
m−i∏
j=1
j 6=b
p
nj
j
nj !
= 1(k − 1)! ,
as this is the multinomial formula for k − 1 draws. Since ∆(−i,k)a ⊂ ∆(−i,k), the
Lipschitz constant of P
(
D ∈ ∆(−i,k)a
)
is at most
m−i∑
b=1
k! 1(k − 1)! = km−i.
Bounding P
(
B̂Ri(x) = a
)
from (4) by 1, the Lipschitz constant for
p 7→ P
(
B˜Ri (p) = a
)
is at most (1− ε) km−i.
A.3 Ergodicity
The proof of ergodicity relies on standard Markov chain theory and a positive
lower bound for the probability that the chain, initiated at any point in (S),
visits any open set in (S) after a finite number of time steps. To prove the
lower bound, we first need to establish the intermediate result Lemma 8. It is
assumed throughout this section that ε > 0.
A.3.1 Approximative history
For i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, and t ∈ N, let ωi,j,t := 1j (si (t)) be the indicator
of a play j by player i at time t, so that
pi,j (t) = (1− β)
∞∑
τ=1
βτ−1ωi,j,t−τ .
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We will call Σ(i) := {0, 1}mi×N the set of binary arrays, indexed by s ∈
{1, . . . ,mi} and t ∈ N, such that for every t there is exactly one s such that
Σ(i)s,t = 1. In other words, Σ(i) represents a possible history for player i, where a 1
at the entry (s, t) indicates that s was played at time t. Likewise, for n ∈ N, we
will call Σ(i,N) := {0, 1}mi×N the set of binary arrays indexed by s ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}
and t ∈ {1, . . . N} obeying the same condition, in other words the history up to
time N .
Let pi ∈ ∆ (Si). We are going to exhibit a sequence of plays of finite length N ,
i.e., an ω ∈ Σ(i,N) for some N ∈ N, such that the partial sum
p
(N)
i,j := (1− β)
N∑
τ=1
βt−1ωi,j,τ
falls close to pi. Namely, we want to prove the following.
Lemma 8. Let pi ∈ ∆ (Si) and δ > 0. We assume that (1− β)mi ≤ 1.
There exists an N(δ) ∈ N, independent of i and pi, such that there is a history
ω
(N)
i ∈ Σ(i,N) for each N ≥ N(δ) which satisfies
p
(N)
i,j = (1− β)
N∑
τ=1
βτ−1ω(N)i,j,τ ∈ (max{pi,j − δ, 0}, pi,j ] (5)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}.
Proof. The following algorithm provides a proof of Lemma 8. Start by setting
p
(0)
i,j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,mi, and ω
(0)
i to the empty array of dimensions 0 and
mi. Define N(δ) as the smallest N ∈ N such that βN < δ, i.e.,
N(δ) := inf{N ∈ N : βN < δ}.
For t ∈ {1, . . . N(δ)}, repeat the following steps :
1. Look for the indices j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} such that pi,j −p(t−1)i,j is maximal, and
call any of these indices a.
2. Append −→1 1,a to ω(t)i . Now ω(t)i,a,t = 1 and ω(t)i,j,t = 0 for j 6= a.
3. Compute p(t)i,j accordingly to (5) and the updated history ω
(t)
i .
Return the final history ω(N(δ))i and values p
(N(δ))
i,j .
We are going to prove inductively that for every t ∈ N, we always have
p
(t)
i,j ≤ pi,j , j = 1, . . . ,m (6)
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and
mi∑
j=1
p
(t)
i,j = 1− βt. (7)
For t = 0, (6) is true since pi,j is non-negative and p(0)i,j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,mi,
which also yields that (7) holds at t = 0. Now assume that (6)–(7) hold at time
t. Since
∑mi
j=1 pi,j = 1, the maximal difference max1≤j≤mi(pi,j − p(t)i,j ) must be
at least βt/mi. By definition, then ωi,a,t+1 = 1 for some a ∈ {2, . . . ,mi} and
p
(t+1)
i,a = (1− β)
t+1∑
τ=1
βτ−1ω(t+1)i,a,τ
= (1− β)βtω(t+1)i,a,t+1 + (1− β)
t∑
τ=1
βτ−1ω(t)i,a,τ
= (1− β)βt + p(t)i,a
≤
(
(1− β)− 1
mi
)
βt + pi,a
Therefore, since (1− β)mi ≤ 1 as assumed, the right-hand side is also bounded by
pi,j . As for other strategies j 6= a, since p(t+1)i,j = p(t)i,j the inequality p(t+1)i,j ≤ pi,j
holds and we have proven the induction step for (6). Now we also know that
p
(t+1)
i,j − p(t)i,j = (1− β)βtω(t+1)i,j,t+1,
and since exactly one among the mi entries in ω(t+1)i,t+1 is 1, the other being zero,
we have
mi∑
j=1
(
p
(t+1)
i,j − p(t)i,j
)
= (1− β)βt.
The induction hypothesis thus leads us to
mi∑
j=1
p
(t+1)
i,j = 1− βt + (1− β)βt = 1− βt+1,
which proves (7) by induction. So in particular after time N(δ), by choice of
N(δ), for every N ≥ N(δ) we have
mi∑
j=1
p
(N)
i,j > 1− δ,
while p(N)i,j ≤ pi,j for every j. Since
∑
j pi,j = 1, this is possible only if p
(N)
i,j >
pi,j − δ for each j = 1, . . . ,mi, leading to the result.
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A.3.2 A useful lower bound
Let x = (x1, x2) ∈ (S). We apply Lemma 8 with δ = ε to x1 and x2,
yielding play records ω(N(ε))1 and ω
(N(ε))
2 , and values p
(N(ε))
i,j such that for every
1 ≤ j ≤ mi and N ≥ N(ε),
p
(N)
i,j ∈ (max{xi,j − ε, 0}, xi,j ] .
We know that for any B ∈ B((S)),
P (x,B) =
m1∑
s1=1
m2∑
s2=1
σ (x, s) 1B (Γ (x, s)) ,
and σ(x, s) is uniformly bounded from below by η = ε/(m1m2) > 0.
The play records ω(N)1 and ω
(N)
2 up to time N from the previous Lemma are
now read in reverse time order. At each time step t ∈ {0, . . . N − 1}, there is a
probability at least η2 that player 1 chooses the strategy 1 ≤ a ≤ m1 given by
ω
(N
1,a,N−t = 1, and player 2 chooses the strategy 1 ≤ b ≤ m2 given by ω(N)2,b,N−t = 1.
Therefore the plays up to time N have a probability at least η2N > 0 of being
dictated by ω(N1 and ω
(N
2 . When this happens, thanks to the Proposition 1, a
history having started by (p1 (0) , p2 (0)) = p will now be at the position
(p1(N), p2(N)) =
N∑
t=1
(
(1− β)βt−1ω(N)1,t , (1− β)βt−1ω(N)2,t
)
+
(
βNp1 (0) , βNp2 (0)
)
,
with probability greater or equal to η2N .
By Lemma 8, the choice of the records ω(N)1 and ω
(N)
2 makes j:th component
of the sum on the right-hand side of (8) take some value between (max{x1,j −
ε, 0},max{x2,j − ε, 0}) and (x1,j , x2,j). As we also have βN < ε and pi,j (0) ≤ 1,
we get pi,j (N) ∈ (xi,j − ε, xi,j + ε). We conclude that for all N ≥ N(ε)
P (|p(N)− x| < ε) ≥ η2N . (10)
In other words, it means that the point y = (p1 (N) , p2 (N)), which is in an
ε-neighbourhood of x, is accessible from p in N steps.
A.3.3 Proof of uniform ergodicity
The path to uniform ergodicity goes through proving that the chain is a so-called
T -chain. For Markov chain theory related concepts used below, we follow the
definitions of Meyn and Tweedie (2012).
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Lemma 9. The Markov chain p is a T -chain.
Proof. From (10) we know that for all rectangles R = R1 ×R2 ∈ B((S)) and
N ≥ N(εR),
PN (x,R) ≥ η2N , x ∈ (S), (11)
where εR = 12 min{λ(R1), λ(R2)} with λ the Lebesgue measure, N(εR) =
inf{N ∈ N : βN < εR}, and η = ε/(m1m2). Note that η < 1, so if εR = 0,
which implies that N(εR) =∞, then η2N(εR) = 0, hence the estimate also covers
degenerate rectangles.
Let O be an open subset of (S), then O can be written as a countable union
of almost disjoint (their boundaries may overlap) closed rectangles (Rj)∞j=1,
Rj = Rj,1 × Rj,2. Since O is open, at least one of the rectangles in the cover
must have a nonempty interior. The probability to reach O from a point x ∈ (S)
is bounded from below by the sum of the probabilities of reaching each of the
rectangles covering O, when staring the chain from x ∈ (S). Hence we have
the following lower bound
∞∑
n=0
Pn(x,O) ≥
∞∑
j=1
PN(εRj )(x,Rj) ≥
∞∑
j=1
η2N(εRj ) > 0, x ∈ (S). (12)
In Lemma 10 below, we use (12) to construct a nontrivial measure ν on
((S),B((S))) such that
∞∑
n=0
Pn(x,B) ≥ ν(B), B ∈ B((S)), x ∈ (S), (13)
hence yielding that (S) is a ν-petite set.
By (12), all open sets are uniformly accessible from any subset of (S) by (12).
Since (S) is open in the relative topology, the previously stated fact implies
that all subsets of (S) are petite (Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Prop. 5.5.3). In
particular, every compact set is petite and it follows that p is a T -chain (Meyn
and Tweedie, 2012, Thm. 6.0.1).
Lemma 10. There exists a nontrivial measure ν on ((S),B((S)) that
satisfies (13).
Proof. DefineR to be the collection of all half-open rectangles
(×m1−1j=1 [a1,j , b1,j))×(×m2−1j=1 [a2,j , b2,j)) in Rm1−1 × Rm2−1. Let the function η¯ : R → [0,∞] be given
by η¯(R) = η2N(εR) (clearly, if R ∩(S) = ∅ then η¯(R) = 0). We define, for any
A ⊂ Rm1−1 × Rm2−1,
ν∗(A) := inf

∞∑
j=1
η¯(Rj) : Rj ∈ R, A ⊂ ∪∞j=1Rj
 .
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Then ν∗ is a countably additive pre-measure on the semi-ring R, and an outer
measure on Rm1−1×Rm2−1. We denote by ν the restriction of ν∗ to its measurable
sets. Carathéodory’s extension theorem says that ν is a measure on the smallest
σ-algebra containingR, which is B(Rm1−1×Rm2−1) since the half-open rectangles
generate the Borel σ-algebra. Furthermore, since ν∗ is σ-finite, ν is the unique
extention of ν∗, and ν agrees with η¯ on R.
Let, for each x ∈ (S), η¯∆(x, ·) be a set-function on Rm1−1×Rm2−1 that satisfies
η¯∆(x,R) =
∞∑
n=1
P¯n(x,R)− ν(R)
=
∞∑
n=1
P¯n(x,R)− η¯(R), R ∈ R.
where P¯ (x,R) := P (x,R ∩ (S)) extends P to B(Rm1−1 × Rm2−1). By (11),
η¯∆(x, ·) is non-negative for all x ∈ (S). For each x ∈ (S), define for any
A ⊂ Rm1−1 × Rm2−1
ν∗∆(x,A) := inf

∞∑
j=1
η¯∆(x,Rj) : Rj ∈ R, A ⊂ ∪∞j=1Rj
 .
Then ν∗∆(x, ·) is, for each x ∈ (S), a countably additive pre-measure on R
and an outer measure on Rm1−1 × Rm2−1, and with the same argument used
to constructed ν, we construct the measures (ν∆(x, ·))x∈(S), ν∆(x, ·) being
the unique extension of ν∗∆(x, ·) (the σ-finite part follows from the definition
of η¯∆(x, ·); a countable sum of σ-finite measures is again a σ-finite measure).
The following fact is essentially (Folland, 1999, Theorem 1.14), and follows as a
corollary to Carathéodory’s extension theorem: Since
ν∆(x,R) =
∞∑
n=1
P¯n(x,R)− ν(R),
for all R ∈ R,
ν∆(x,B) =
∞∑
n=1
P¯n(x,B)− ν(B)
for all B ∈ B(Rm1−1 × Rm2−1). Then, in particular,
ν∆(x,B) =
∞∑
n=1
Pn(x,B)− ν(B), B ∈ B((S)), x ∈ (S)
from which it follows that
sup
x∈(S)
∞∑
n=1
Pn(x,B) ≥ ν(B), B ∈ B((S)).
Defining ν as the restriction of ν to B((S)) completes the proof.
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Lemma 11. The Markov chain p is open set irreducible.
Proof. A point x ∈ (S) is called reachable if for every open set O ∈ B((S))
containing x,
∞∑
n=1
Pn(y,O) > 0, y ∈ (S).
We know that all x ∈ (S) are reachable by (10). A Markov chain is open set
irreducible if every point is reachable.
Proposition 12. The chain p is ψ-irreducible.
Proof. We know that p is an open set irreducible T -chain. By (Meyn and
Tweedie, 2012, Prop. 6.2.1), p is ψ-irreducible.
Remark 13. The measure ν is an irreducibility measure for p (Meyn and
Tweedie, 2012, Prop. 5.5.4 (ii)).
Remark 14. The state space (S) is a petite set, but not a small set, since
there are sets in the corners of (S) which the chain needs arbitrarily long time
to reach.
We move on towards showing uniform ergodicity for p. The argument is based on
(Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Thm. 16.2.5), which says that if p is a ψ-irreducible
and aperiodic T -chain, and if the state space (S) is compact, then p is uniformly
ergodic.
Lemma 15. The Markov chain p is aperiodic.
Proof. The negative implication of (Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Prop. 5.4.6) says
that if there exists no absorbing state for p(d), the chain corresponding to the
transition kernel P d, for any d ≥ 2, then p is aperiodic.
Assume that D is an absorbing state for p(d), that is infx∈D P d(x,D) = 1. By
(11), D must contain all rectangles R ⊂ (S), since infx∈D PNd(x,R) ≥ η2Nd >
0 for any N ≥ N(εR). This implies that D = (S) is the only absorbing state
for p(d) and we conclude that the chain is aperiodic.
We have proven the following result:
Proposition 16. The chain p is uniformly ergodic.
Proof. This follows by ψ-irreducibility (Proposition 12) and aperiodicity (Lemma 15),
see (Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Thm. 16.2.5).
26
By (Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Thm. 15.0.1), ψ-irreducibility and aperiodicity
implies that p has an invariant probability measure µ∗ε. By (Meyn and Tweedie,
2012, Thm. 16.0.2), uniform ergodicity of p is equivalent to the existence of
r > 1 and R <∞ such that for all x,
dTV (Pn(x, ·), µ∗ε) ≤ Rr−n,
where dTV is the total variation distance on P((S)). Clearly, µ∗ε is the unique
invariant probability measure of p (in (P((S)), dTV )). By (Villani, 2008, Thm.
6.18), the p-Wasserstein distance Wp is for all p ≥ 1 controlled by the total
variation on bounded sets, and
sup
x∈(S)
W pp (Pn(x, ·), µ∗ε) ≤ CRr−n,
where C depends on p and |(S)|. The last inequality implies the statement of
Theorem 3.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The proof consists of four steps.
Step 1. Bounding the probability of reaching Bδ(C ) in finite time.
To find a lower bound for the probability to go from an arbitrary point p(t) ∈
Bδ(C )c to Bδ(C ) in finite time we create a particular path of positive probability
that does exactly that. Let p(t) ∈ (S) be given and let s1 ∈ S1 × S2 be
the strategy profile played at in period t. Either s1 is a CURB block, or the
best reply set to s1 contains a strategy not in s1, BR(−→1s1) 6⊂ s1. If the former
statement is true this step of the proof is complete. That is not always the
case, therefore assume that we are in the case of the latter statement, i.e. that
the best reply set to s1 contains a strategy not in s1. Then, the probability of
both players only sampling s1 at time t+ 1 is bounded from below by (1− β)2k.
Hence the probability of a strategy profile s2 ∈ BR(−→1s1), s2 6= s1, being played
is bounded from below by
P
(
B˜R(p(t)) = s2 | p(t)
)
≥ (1− β)
2k
m1m2
(1− ε)2.
Now let F2 be the smallest block F2 ∈ S1 × S2 that contains {s1, s2}. Either
F2 is a CURB block or BR(∆(F2)) 6⊂ F2, in which case there is at least one
sample D of size k from F2 such that BR(D) 6⊂ F2. The probability of sampling
that particular D, and the best replies to D being such that at least one of
them is not in F2, is again bounded away from zero. Until we have sampled a
sequence of strategy profiles, each extending the set Fi, such that Fi is a CURB
block, there is always some sample with positive sampling probability such that
BR(D) 6⊂ Fi. The probability of playing a strategy si which is a best reply to
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D which is not in Fi, si ∈ BR(D) ∩ (Fi)c, is therefore bounded from below by
P
(
B˜R(p(t+ i− 1)) = si | p(t+ i− 1)
)
≥
(
βi−1(1− β))2k
m1m2
(1− ε)2.
Keep filling Fi, Fi+1, Fi+2, . . . with strategies from the CURB block in this
fashion, so that FT spans a CURB block and T ≤ m1 + m2 (Hurkens, 1995,
Lemma 1). To get a uniform lower bound, assume that T = m1 +m2 and that
once Fi is a CURB block the following T − i strategy profiles are inside the
CURB block. The probability of this progression of plays is bounded from below:
let E be the event that p(t + T ) puts at most βT+1 mass outside the CURB
block spanned by FT , then
P (E) ≥
(
β2k
)(T−1)! (1− β)2Tk
mT1 m
T
2
(1− ε)2T .
Inside the CURB block spanned by FT , there is a minimal CURB block which
we denote by C = C1 × C2. The probability of both players sampling from C
given the state p(t+ T ) (as described above) is greater or equal to
P ((D1/k,D2/k) ∈ (C) | D from p(t+ T )) ≥
(
βT (1− β))2k (1− ε)2.
Starting from p(t) ∈ Bδ(C)c, a sequence of plays that results in p(t+ T + T ∗) ∈
Bδ(C) is to play T strategies to fill FT followed by T ∗ strategies from the minimal
CURB block C. Conditional on p(t) ∈ Bδ(C )c and the aforementioned event E ,
the probability that p(t+ T + T ∗) ∈ Bδ(C) ⊂ Bδ(C ) is bounded from below by
P
(
(D1, D2)(t+ T + i) ∈ (C), i = 0, . . . , T ∗ − 1 | p(t+ T ) as above
)
≥ (βT (1− β)(1− ε))2kT∗ =: γ(ε, T, T ∗).
Now p(t+ T + T ∗) gives at most βT∗ probability to all strategy profiles outside
(C). Therefore, we pick δ > 0 and let T ∗ ∈ N be such that βT∗ < δ and,
summarizing the analysis in this step, we have derived a bound on the probability
of moving from any point p(t) ∈ Bδ(C )c to Bδ(C ) in T + T ∗ steps. We denote
this bound by K and it is given by
PT+T
∗
(p(t), Bδ(C ))
≥
(
β2k
)(T−1)! (1− β)2TK (1− ε)2T
mT1 m
T
2
γ(ε, T, T ∗) =: K.
Step 2. Expected exit time from Bδ(C ).
Once in Bδ(C ), one of two things must happen for the process to leave. Either
one player makes a mistake or one player samples at least one strategy from
outside the minimal CURB block C the process is currently centered around.
So instead of calculating the time to the first exit, denoted τε, we calculate the
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expected time until one of these two things happen the first time. Let τ∗ε denote
the time, starting from t = 0, until either a strategy is sampled outside C or one
player makes an ε-tremble. We denote the expression for the probability that
τ∗ε > t
∗, t∗ ∈ N, with Qε(t∗),
Qε(t∗) := P (τ∗ε > t∗ | p(0) ∈ Bδ(C)) =
t∗∏
t=0
(1− βtδ)2k(1− ε)2.
For the case ε = 0, we use the fact that
∑∞
t=0 β
tδ is convergent to conclude
that
∏∞
t=0(1− βtδ)2k approaches a non-zero limit. Since Qε is decreasing and
non-negative,
lim
t∗→∞Qε(t
∗) =
{
Q∗ ∈ (0, 1), if ε = 0,
0, if ε > 0.
We can now derive a bound for τε, the expected time to exit from Bδ(C ),
E [τε] ≥ E [τ∗ε ]
≥ E [τ∗ε | τ∗ε ≥ t∗, p(0) ∈ Bδ(C)]
× P(τ∗ε ≥ t∗ | p(0) ∈ Bδ(C))P(p(0) ∈ Bδ(C)))
≥ t∗Qε(t∗)ν(Bδ(C)),
where ν is the initial distribution of the state process and ν(Bδ(C)) is the
probability that p(0) ∈ Bδ(C). We know that the state process converges
weakly to the invariant distribution for all initial distributions and therefore ν is
any distribution on (S) of our choice. Choosing ν as the distribution of the
constructed p(t+ T + T ∗) from above,
E[τε] ≥ t∗
t∗∏
t=0
(1− βtδ)2k(1− ε)2
= t∗(1− ε)2t∗Q0(t∗)
≥ t∗(1− ε)2t∗Q∗,
where t∗ is any positive integer. For a fixed ε, the function t∗ 7→ t∗(1− ε)2t∗ is
maximized by t∗(ε) = −(2 ln(1− ε))−1. There is therefore a decreasing sequence
of positive numbers (εj)∞j=1, tending to zero as j → ∞, such that t∗(εj) is an
integer and
E[τε] ≥ − Q
∗
2e ln(1− εj) ,
which diverges to ∞ as j →∞.
Step 3. Bounding µ∗ε(Bδ(C)c) from above.
We know that for any ε > 0 there exists a unique invariant probability measure
µ∗ε. We also have a lower bound for P (x,Bδ(C )) uniform over x ∈ Bδ(C )c, and
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a lower bound for the expected time the process stays in Bδ(C ) once it has
entered.
The probability given by the invariant distribution to the set Bδ(C ) is at least the
sum over n of the probability of: the state process not being in it (n+ 1)(T +T ∗)
steps ago, but in it n(T + T ∗) steps ago, and then staying there for at least
n(T + T ∗) time steps,
1 ≥ µ∗ε(Bδ(C )) ≥
∞∑
n=0
(∫
Bδ(C )c
PT+T
∗
(x,Bδ(C )) dµ∗ε(x)
)
P (τε ≥ n(T + T ∗))
≥ µ∗ε (Bδ(C )c)K
( ∞∑
n=0
P
(
τε
T + T ∗ ≥ n
))
≥ µ∗ε (Bδ(C )c)
K
T + T ∗ E [τ
∗
ε ] .
Step 4. Putting it all together.
The collection (µ∗ε)ε>0 is tight because (S) is compact. So there exists a
subsequence that converges weakly to µ∗ ∈ P((S)). The limit µ∗ is not
necessarily unique, however, by the Portmanteau theorem,
lim inf
ε→0
µ∗ε(U) ≥ µ∗(U)
for all open sets U of (S). Note that Bδ(C )c is open, and
µ∗ε(Bδ(C )c) ≤
T + T ∗
KE[τ∗ε ]
.
Since K > 0 increases as ε → 0, E [τ∗ε ] → ∞ as ε → 0, and T + T ∗ does not
depend on ε,
µ∗(Bδ(C )c) ≤ lim inf
ε→0
µ∗ε(Bδ(C )c) ≤ (T + T ∗)lim inf
ε→0
1
KE[τ∗] = 0.
We conclude that that µ∗ε (Bδ(C ))→ 1 as ε→ 0.
B Concentration around approximate Nash equi-
librium: proofs
Parts of this appendix relies on the assumption that the game is of size 2× 2 and
has a unique mixed Nash Equilibrium. Generically, all 2× 2 games without pure
Nash equilibria must have the basic Matching Pennies structure. One player
will be ’agreeing’ and the other ’disagreeing’ in the sense that the best reply
of the agreeing player is to play the same strategy (0 or 1) as the disagreeing
player. On the other hand, the disagreeing player’s best reply is to not play the
same strategy as the agreeing player. Any other situation will generically yield
at least one pure equilibrium, and generically a strict pure equilibrium.
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B.1 Unique fixed point to the expected best reply
Lemma 17. Let G be a 2× 2 game with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium N∗
and let k, the number of samples, be an integer such that N∗1 k 6∈ N and N∗2 k 6∈ N.
Then there exists a unique fixed point n∗ = (n∗1, n∗2) ∈ int((S)) to the system
E
[
B˜R1(n∗2)
]
= n∗1,
E
[
B˜R2(n∗1)
]
= n∗2.
(14)
Proof. We will refer to the player 1 and 2 as the agreeing and the disagreeing
player, respectively. The Nash equilibrium N∗ = (N∗1 , N∗2 ) defines the ’cut-off’
Mi := bN∗i kc, i = 1, 2. The cut-off is such that if more than M1 of the agreeing
player’s k samples from the disagreeing player’s history are 1, he plays 1. The
disagreeing player will play strategy 1 if more than M2 of his k samples from
the agreeing player’s history of plays are 0. Consider the function
pk,M (x) := (1− ε)
k∑
i=M+1
(
k
i
)
xi(1− x)k−i + ε/2.
Given that player history is in state (a, d), the probability that the agreeing and
disagreeing player plays strategy 1 is pa(d) := pk,M2(d) and pd(a) := 1−pk,M1(a),
respectively. We can now rewrite (14) as
pa(n∗2) = n∗1, pd(n∗1) = n∗2.
The range of pa and pb is Iε := [ε/2, 1−ε/2]. Therefore, by the strict monotonicity
and the continuity of pa and pd, we may rewrite (14) again, now as
(pa ◦ pd) (n∗1) = n∗1, n∗1 ∈ Iε,
(pd ◦ pa) (n∗2) = n∗2, n∗2 ∈ Iε.
Note that since pa and pd are strictly increasing and decreasing, respectively,
both pa ◦ pd and pd ◦ pa are strictly decreasing functions from [0, 1] to [pd(1−
ε/2), pd(ε/2)] and [pa(ε/2), pa(1− ε/2)], respectively. Therefore
min{pa ◦ pd(ε/2), pd ◦ pa(ε/2)} ≥ min{pd(1− ε/2), pa(ε/2)} > ε/2,
max{pa ◦ pd(1− ε/2), pd ◦ pa(1− ε/2)} ≤ max{pd(ε/2), pa(1− ε/2)} < 1− ε/2.
Hence, since pa ◦ pd and pd ◦ pa are continuous, they intersect the straight line
x = y at a (function-wise) unique point in their respective images and these
intersection points are n∗1 and n∗2.
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B.2 Global exponential stability of mean-field dynamics
Denote by ξ the solution mapping of x˙(t) = F (x(t)), x(0) = p, where F (x) :=
E[B˜R(x)]− x. Then
ξ(t, p) = p+
∫ t
0
F (ξ(s, p))ds.
Lemma 18. Let Σ contain all points x ∈ (S) such that F (x) = 0 or such
that ξ(t, x) satisfies (ξ(t, x)− y)∗F (ξ(t, x)) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 and some y, such
that F (y) = 0. The mapping t 7→ ξ(t, p) is globally asymptotically stable, with
limt→∞ ξ(t, p) ∈ Σ. Furthermore, if the game is 2× 2 with a unique mixed Nash
equilibrium, then Σ = {n∗}, the unique root of F .
Proof. Let V (x) := 12‖x− n∗‖22 where n∗ is a root of F . The existence of n∗ is
granted by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem; (S) is compact and convex and F
is continuous. Differentiating V with respect to time at the solution mapping
ξ(t, p), we get
−V˙ (ξ(t, p)) = −∇V (ξ(t, p))ξ˙(t, p)
= −(ξ(t, p)− n∗)TF (ξ(t, p))
= −(ξ(t, p)− n∗)T
(
E[B˜R(ξ(t, p)) | ξ(t, p)]− ξ(t, p)
)
= 2V (ξ(t, p))− (ξ(t, p)− n∗)T
(
E[B˜R(ξ(t, p) | ξ(t, p)]− n∗)
)
= V (ξ(t, p))− V (E[B˜R(ξ(t, p)) | ξ(t, p)])
+ 12‖ξ(t, p)− E[B˜R(ξ(t, p)) | ξ(t, p)]‖
2
2
where in the last step we used the identity 2yT z = ‖y‖22 + ‖z‖22 − ‖y − z‖22,
y, z ∈ Rd. We notice that
V (E[B˜R(ξ(t, p))‖ξ(t, p)])
= 12‖E[B˜R(ξ(t, p)) | ξ(t, p)]− ξ(t, p) + ξ(t, p)− n
∗‖22
≤ 12‖E[B˜R(ξ(t, p)) | ξ(t, p)]− ξ(t, p)‖
2
2 + V (ξ(t, p)),
hence V˙ (ξ(t, p)) ≤ 0. Furthermore, V is radially unbounded. Let R := {x ∈
(S) : (x−n∗)TF (x) = 0}, then R = {x ∈ (S) : V˙ (x) = 0} and R contains n∗,
any other point solution to F (x) = 0, and all x such that the vectors (x− n∗)
and F (x) are orthogonal. By a global invariant set theorem (Slotine, Li et al.,
1991, Thm. 3.5), ξ(t, p) converges to the largest invariant set of R, which is Σ.
Next, for 2 × 2 games with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium, we show the
points in R different from n∗ (now unique) cannot be in Σ. First note that if
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x ∈ R\{n∗}, then xi 6= n∗i , i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, assume that player
2 has the disagreeing role and that x0 > n∗. If x0 ∈ R\{n∗} then F (x0) 6= 0
and a trajectory starting in x0 will evolve according to the dynamic system
x˙(t) = F (x(t)), x(0) = x0. Assume, towards a contradiction, that x(t) ∈ R\{n∗}
for all t ≥ 0. After some finite positive time, call it t∗, the path must cross the
line (x, n∗2;x ∈ [0, 1]) (because the trajectory starts at at x0 > n∗ and player
2 is disagreeing, it will move "south-east" in (S)). This crossing contradicts
x(t∗) ∈ R\{n∗} since x(t∗) ∈ R\{n∗} would require both components of x(t∗)
to be different from n∗. The same argument can be carried out for all other
possible initial positions (x0 − n∗ < 0 or mixed signs) and for switched player
roles. It follows that {n∗} is the only invariant set in R.
B.3 Trajectories over bounded time intervals
By (Benaïm and Weibull, 2003, Lemma 1), the state process p(·) and its mean-
field approximation ξ(·, p(0)) lie close to each other (over bounded time intervals)
with high probability. We have to do one modification to apply the result: we
re-scale size of the time steps taken by our learning process. This has no effect
on previous results since we will always (for a fixed β) have a fixed positive step
size. The original proof of Benaïm and Weibull (2003) can be used to prove the
lemma below.
Lemma 19. Scale the step size of t by (1 − β). Let T = N(1 − β) for some
N ∈ N and let (pˆ(t); t ∈ [0, T ]) be the linear interpolation of the path (p(t); t =
0, 1− β, . . . , (1− β)N). Then, for all η > 0,
P
(
max
t∈[0,T ]
‖pˆ(t)− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞ ≥ η
)
≤ 2(m1 +m2 − 2)e−η2c
where c is a positive constant and proportional to e−γT (T (1−β))−1, where γ > 0
depends only on the size of the game.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Let t ≥ s ≥ 0. Below, K will denote a generic positive constant. Whenever
η > ‖ξ(t, pˆ(t− s))− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞, Lemma 19 yields that
P(‖pˆ(t)− ξ(t, 0)‖∞ ≥ η)
= P (‖pˆ(t)− ξ(t, pˆ(t− s))‖∞ ≥ η − ‖ξ(t, pˆ(t− s)− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞)
≤ K exp
(
−(η − ‖ξ(t, pˆ(t− s))− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞)2K e
−γs
s(1− β)
)
.
Furthermore,
P(‖pˆ(t)− n∗‖∞ ≥ η)
= P (‖pˆ(t)− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞ ≥ η − ‖ξ(t, p(0))− n∗‖∞) ,
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so we have that
P(‖pˆ(t)− n∗‖∞ ≥ η) = P
(
‖pˆ(t)− ξ(t, pˆ(t− s))‖∞ ≥ η
− ‖ξ(t, pˆ(t− s))− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞ − ‖ξ(t, p(0))− n∗‖∞
)
≤ K exp
(
− (η − ‖ξ(t, pˆ(t− s))− ξ(t, p(0))‖∞ − ‖ξ(t, p(0))− n∗‖∞)2
×K e
−γs
s(1− β)
)
.
Letting t→∞, we know from Lemma 18 that ξ(t, p(0))→ n∗, so
lim
t→∞P(‖pˆ(t)− n
∗‖∞ ≥ η)
≤ sup
x∈(S)
K exp
(
−(η − ‖ξ(s, x)− n∗‖∞)2K e
−γs
s(1− β)
)
.
Choosing σ large enough, so that for all s ≥ σ: ‖ξ(s, x)− n∗‖∞ ≤ η/2 uniformly
in x. Then
lim
t→∞P
(‖pˆ(t)− n∗‖2∞ ≥ η) = o(exp(− Kη21− β
))
,
proving the theorem.
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